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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the redistributional view of trade credit from the demand 
side, based on a unique micro data of Japanese small firms where information on 
transactions of intermediate goods between firms of different size is available. The 
redistributional hypothesis is tested in two steps. In the first step we examine the 
relationship of customer dependence on bank loans with a higher proportion of 
purchases from large suppliers. In the second step we examine the effect of a 
dependence on large suppliers on trade credit. We find evidence supporting the 
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1.  Introduction     
It has been asserted that trade credit is a substitute for bank loans. This is especially so 
for small and medium-sized enterprises (hereafter as SMEs) that have few alternative 
credit sources and are most likely to face credit rationing during a tight monetary regime. 
The substitution mechanism premises that suppliers with better access to credit will 
redistribute the credit they receive to SME customers by way of trade credit. This is the 
so-called redistributional view of trade credit. Appealing as this assertion is, very few 
tests of this hypothesis have been conducted using micro data, to the best of the authors’ 
knowledge. This is probably due to the paucity of firm-level transaction and relationship 
data between suppliers and customers. 
The aim of this study is to test the redistributional hypothesis of trade credit from 
the corporate demand side of trade credit by using unique cross-sectional data of 
Japanese SMEs. The data set is the Basis Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, 
conducted by the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Agency. It is a comprehensive 
survey that was started in the 2004 fiscal year to investigate financial and managerial 
aspects of SMEs as well as business investment trends. The survey includes information 
on transactions between firms (the firms to which goods are sold and the firms from 
whom goods are purchased) in addition to balance sheets and profit and loss statements 
of individual SMEs.   
This data set is ideal for examining the redistributional role of trade credit from the 
demand side, since the customers that benefit most from credit redistribution are SMEs 
and our data set contains rich information about the suppliers of trade credit to SMEs. 
The redistributional hypothesis of trade credit can be rigorously tested in two steps. The 
first step is an examination of the relationship of dependence on bank credit by SMEs 
that make transactions with large suppliers. The second step is to examine the amount of 
accounts payable extended to the SMEs by large suppliers. Consider an SME that has 
limited access to bank credit and is likely to be borrowing-constrained. If the SME 
increases transactions with large suppliers and they extend trade credit to the SME 
customer, then we can say that the redistributional hypothesis is supported. Our 2 
 
estimation results show that the redistributional hypothesis is indeed supported for 
solvent firms, but not for firms with a debt overhang.   
Furthermore, we find that bank loans and trade credit are substitutes even for 
debt-overhang firms, but substitutability is independent of the extent to which purchases 
are made from large suppliers. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the past studies on the 
redistributional hypothesis of trade credit and states precisely the redistributional 
hypothesis in a testable form. Section 3 explains the data set we use and gives the 
descriptive statistics on trade credit of the Japanese SMEs in our data set. Section 4 
presents the empirical evidence on the redistributional hypothesis of trade credit. 
Section  5  concludes  the  study.          
2. Redistributional View of Trade Credit: Literature Survey and Empirical Strategy 
2.1 Literature Survey 
Meltzer (1960) first emphasized the redistributional role of trade credit. He 
hypothesized that firms with easy access to bank credit can increase credit in the form 
of trade credit more than those firms that are constrained in the bank loans market. In 
general the firms with easy access to bank credit are large firms and those constrained in 
the bank loan market are small firms, so that this is redistribution of credit among firms 
by size. He finds evidence for this redistributional view in the time series data, 
especially in periods of tight money. Following his study, Jaffee (1971), Ramey (1992) 
and Nilsen (2002) obtained similar evidence supporting the redistributional view from 
time series data.
1  
Petersen and Rajan (1997) is the first study, based on U.S. firm-level data, of the 
redistributional role of credit. Based on the National Survey of Small Business Finance, 
they find that a firm’s access to external finance has a significantly positive effect on the 
amount of accounts receivable. They also find that firms with large unused lines of 
credit demand less trade credit. Furthermore, they find that a longer relationship with a 
                                                 
1  Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), on the other hand, find that trade credit does not increase during 
a period of tight money.     3 
 
financial institutional is negatively correlated with demand for trade credit. Thus they 
conclude that trade credit is used mainly by firms that are constrained by their 
institutional lenders. Nilsen (2002) extends the Petersen and Rajan (1997) study for 
listed firms and finds that even large firms without a bond rating increase demand for 
trade credit in periods of tight money. De Haan and Sterken (2006) use a pan-European 
dataset of both listed and unlisted firms and find that a monetary contraction affects 
private firms’ trade credit more negatively than the trade credit positions of public 
firms.  
Love et al. (2007) is an interesting study on the redistributional role of trade credit 
based on international micro data. They show that the redistributional channel shuts 
down during financial crises when all sources of finance available to large firms dry up. 
Using data of firms operating in the 1994 Peso devaluation in Mexico and the 1997 
Asian crisis, they find that accounts receivable drop sharply in the post-crisis period. 
They conclude that firms’ lack of access to bank loans forces them to reduce the supply 
of trade credit to their customers.   
McMillan and Woodruff (1999) use unique survey data of Vietnamese firms that 
contains detailed information on individual firms’ relationships with their customers. By 
estimating the supply equation of trade credit, they find no relationship between 
offering credit to customers and receiving bank loans. However, they find that receiving 
credit from suppliers significantly increases the likelihood of offering credit to 
customers.   
As for the Japanese evidence, there is a growing number of studies dealing with this 
issue. Ono (2001) and Ogawa (2003) are two recent studies based on time series data. 
Ono uses the interest differential between the bank loan rate and the bill discount rate as 
one of the determinants of accounts payable, and finds that on the whole this interest 
differential exerts a significantly positive effect on accounts payable, indicating that 
trade credit and bank loans are substitutes. Ogawa (2003) includes the lending attitude 
of financial institutions as one of the explanatory variables in a trade credit regression 
and finds that when the lending attitude becomes more severe, accounts payable of 
medium-sized firms increase significantly, supporting the redistributional view. On the 4 
 
other hand, Taketa and Udell (2006) find some evidence that trade credit and financial 
institution lending are complements during periods of financial crisis.     
Takehiro and Ohkusa (1995) is the first study based on micro data of Japanese firms. 
Using the panel data of listed firms over 26 years (1967-1992), they find that an 
increasing severity in lending attitude of financial institutions reduces trade credit 
significantly. Their evidence indicates that bank credit and trade credit are complements 
rather than substitutes. Uchida et al. (2006) investigate the relationship between bank 
loans and trade credit by using a variable to represent the strength of the buyer-seller 
relationship in a bank loan regression. Their results are favorable to the view that bank 
loans and trade credit are complements, although statistically insignificant.     
Other studies based on micro data are generally favorable to the redistributional 
view. Tsuruta (2006), using the Credit Risk Database (CRD), finds that when the bank 
loan rate increases, borrowers increase trade payable. Tsuruta (2007) also finds 
evidence of trade credit problems during the Asian financial turmoil in 1997/1998 using 
the same dataset. Using the data of large trading companies that supply both loans and 
trade credit, Uesugi and Yamashiro (2004) find that large trading companies increase 
accounts receivable when banks are unwilling to lend.   
On the other hand, Uesugi (2005), using micro data of SMEs for the period of 2001 
to 2003, finds that trade credit and bank loans are complements. Fukuda et al. (2006) 
show that substitution between bank loans and trade credit is observed when the 
banking sector is healthy, but during financial crises in the late 1990s to the early 2000s 
bank loans and trade credit contracted at the same time. This evidence is in line with 
Love et al. (2007). To summarize the Japanese evidence, the redistributional view is as 
a whole supported by both time series and micro data, but the complementary 
relationship between bank lending and trade credit is also observed during the periods 
of financial crisis.
2 
2.2 Empirical Strategy 
                                                 
2  Japan’s Small Business Research Institute (2005) also states that trade credit is a substitute for 
bank loans for small firms with less liquidity. Their analysis is based on descriptive statistics of 
firm-level data.   5 
 
The essential problem of finding evidence of substitution of bank loans and trade credit 
is the identification of supply and demand effects. Does a monetary contraction lead to a 
lower supply of loans by banks or is it a drop in demand for loans? Do firms ask for 
more trade credit or do firms increase the supply of trade credit because of higher 
implicit interest rates? The identification problems can be relieved if institutional 
information on credit rationing and other informational asymmetries can be used. This 
type of information can be found in information on past performance of firms in 
applying for loans, credit lines with main banks, and/or information on the provision of 
goods in exchange for credit. Here we use two sets of indicators: first, the size of the 
firms, because smaller firms are more likely to receive trade credit from large firms than 
the other way round and second, we have information on the status of loan applications 
by small firms.   
What has been lacking in past empirical studies examining the redistributional 
view of trade credit is that the channel of the increase in the trade credit is not taken into 
account explicitly when bank credit becomes hard to obtain. The redistributional view 
states that large firms that have easy access to bank loans increase the supply of trade 
credit to the small and medium-sized customers constrained in the bank loan market. To 
test this view rigorously, we need transaction data of trade credit between firms. 
Fortunately our micro data set, to be explained in detail in the next section, has 
information on the fraction of SMEs that purchase from large suppliers, which enables 
us to shed light on the redistributional view from the demand side along this line.   
Given this information, the redistributional hypothesis is tested in the following 
two steps. The first step is to examine the relationship between SMEs’ bank dependence 
and their transactions with large suppliers. According to the redistributional view, when 
SMEs have weaker relationships with banks, they cannot raise funds easily from banks 
at a lower price, so they will increase purchases from large suppliers for the purpose of 
obtaining trade credit.   
The second step is to examine the link between dependence on large suppliers and 
the amount of trade credit given to the SME customers. It is expected that the more 
reliant on large suppliers, the more credit will be provided in the form of accounts 6 
 
payable to the SME customers. Testable equations corresponding to the two steps above 
will be formalized in Section 4. Should the assertions in the two steps both be supported 
by the data, we might conclude that the redistributional hypothesis of trade credit is 
valid.  
3. Data Characteristics and Descriptive Statistics of SME Trade Credit 
The Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law in Japan stipulates that rigorous statistical 
investigation should be made to understand the actual conditions of SMEs. To attain 
this goal, the SME Agency has conducted the Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized 
Enterprises (BSSME) since the fiscal year of 2004. The BSSME is a comprehensive 
survey to investigate all aspects of SMEs, such as financial conditions, managerial 
information and the trend of business investment.
3 
The survey includes important information on transactions of intermediate goods 
between firms in addition to the basic balance sheets (B/S) and profit and loss (P/L) 
statements of individual SMEs. Specifically, it has information on the fraction of goods 
purchased from large and small suppliers, as well as the fraction of intermediate goods 
sold to large and small enterprises and individual consumers. This information can be 
used to shed light on the pattern of trade credit between firms of different size. 
In this study we use the BSSME from fiscal year 2004. One hundred thousand 
firms are randomly chosen from the population of 4.35 million SMEs. In this survey the 
number of firms available for our statistical purpose is 41,807, but the information on 
accounts payable and related statistics is available only for the subset of 1,659 firms on 
which our study is based.
4 Table 1 shows the distribution of sampled firms across 
                                                 
3  In the survey the SME is defined as an enterprise with equity capital less than 300 million yen 
or total employees less than 300 persons for construction, transportation, manufacturing and 
some of the real estate and service industries. For the other industries, the SME is defined as an   
enterprise with an even smaller amount of equity capital and/or smaller number of employees. 
4  In 41,807 sample firms, depending on the characteristics of the questionnaire, 12,603 firms 
have full information on B/S and P/L statements, but for the remains, mainly proprietary 
sampled firms, only limited information is available. In addition, since our main concern is on 
bank-firm relationships, firms with no responses to the questions on bank-firm relations, which 
amounts to 6,256 out of 12,603 firms, are excluded from the sample. The information on the 
buyer of intermediate inputs is also indispensable in this study, which is available for 3,265 7 
 
industries. The wholesale industry has the largest share (35.7%) followed by the retail 
industry (24.5%) and the manufacturing industry (18.4%). The first column of Table 2 
shows the distribution of sampled firms by employees. About one-fourth of the firms 
have less than 5 employees, while one-third have more than 50 employees. The first 
column of Table 3 shows the distribution of sampled firms by equity capital. 
Surprisingly about half of sampled firms have less than 10 million yen equity capital. 
The virtue of the BSSME is that it contains rich information on the main bank 
relationship. A main bank is a bank with which a firm has the closest relationship in 
terms of not only loans but also other financial services, such as deposits, discounting 
bills and professional services on financial and managerial affairs. The first column of 
Table 4 shows what type of main bank the sample firms are affiliated with. The main 
bank of about half of the sampled firms is a regional bank that has its banking business 
mainly in the prefecture of the firms’ headquarters. City banks are the second most 
represented group of banks, and are large banks with both domestic and foreign 
operations. About 27% of the sampled firms chose their main bank as a city bank. 
Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives, financial institutions that exclusively lend to 
SMEs, were chosen as the main bank by 22% of the sampled firms.   
The information on the type of collateral or personal guarantee and the response of 
the main bank to a loan application are also summarized in the first column of Tables 5 
and 6, respectively. As is seen in the tables, more than 60% of the firms in the sample 
pledged collateral or personal guarantees to their main banks. Actually, it turns out that 
18.2% of firms pledged both collateral and personal guarantees.   
As for the response of the main bank to a loan application, in nearly half of the 
cases, the loan application was accepted as is. A loan application was turned down or 
reduced for only 7.1% of the sampled firms. It should be noted that for more than 
one-fourth of the firms, the main bank offered loans above the amount or with looser 
lending conditions than in the original applications. 
                                                                                                                                               
firms. After excluding firms with inconsistent items in B/S and P/L statements, together with 
the data screening stated above, the number of firms in the final sample is reduced to 1,659. 8 
 
Table 7 shows the mean, median and standard deviation of major items of the 
balance sheet and profit and loss statements as well as variables related to trade credit. 
The mean of total assets and sales are 1,385 and 1,860 million yen, while the 
corresponding medians are 369 and 584 million yen, respectively. Mean values far 
exceed median values, indicating that their frequency distributions are skewed to the 
right. The mean (median) of the number of employees is 58 (31). The average ratio of 
borrowing from financial institutions to total debt and that of short-term borrowing from 
financial institutions to current liabilities, proxies of bank dependence, are 0.52 and 0.30, 
respectively. 
The mean of accounts receivable and accounts payable are 304 and 271 million 
yen, while the corresponding medians are 52 and 45 million yen, respectively. The 
mean ratio of accounts receivable and accounts payable to sales are 0.150 and 0.118, 
respectively.
5 These ratios are much higher than those of small firms in the 1988-1989 
National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) and are comparable to Compustat 
data on large firms in the U.S.
6 The mean ratio of purchases from large suppliers and 
small suppliers are 32.2% and 67.8%, respectively.
7, 
8 Figure 1 shows the frequency 
distribution of the ratio of purchases from large suppliers. About half of the sample 
firms make no purchase from large suppliers, while one-tenth of the sample firms 
exclusively purchase from large suppliers. It should be also noted that the ratio of 
purchases from large suppliers exhibits considerable variations across industries. Table 
8 shows the mean and median ratio of purchases from large suppliers and borrowing to 
total debt as well as other important variables across industries. The mean ratio of 
purchases from large suppliers is highest in information and communications (64.4%) 
and lowest in hotels and restaurants (4.4%). 
                                                 
5  3.7% of firms recorded zero balance of accounts payable.   
6 Petersen and Rajan (1997) report that the mean ratio of accounts receivable and accounts 
payable to sales is 0.073 and 0.044, respectively, for the NSSBF samples, while the 
corresponding ratios are 0.185 and 0.116 for the Compustat firms.   
7 The denominator of the ratio of purchases from large and small suppliers is purchases from 
domestic suppliers, excluding purchases from foreign suppliers. Hence the ratios of purchases 
from large and small suppliers sum up to unity. 
8 The median proportion of purchases from large suppliers is only 5% and its frequency 
distribution is heavily skewed to the right. 9 
 
4. Empirical Examination of the Redistributional View of Trade Credit   
4.1 Specification of the Redistributional Hypothesis of Trade Credit 
As stated in Section 2, the redistributional role of trade credit is tested from the firms’ 
demand side in two steps. The first step is to investigate the relationship of a customer’s 
dependence on bank loans with the extent to which the customer purchases from large 







i i i i i
DINDJ DBANKJ
BDEPEND DEBTR PROFIT SALES LPURC
ε γ β
α α α α α
+ + +







4 3 2 1 0 log
   (1) 
where 
LPURCi: proportion of intermediate goods purchased from large suppliers, 
SALESi: sales, 
PROFITi: ratio of operating profit to sales, 
DEBTRi: debt-asset ratio, 
BDEPENDi: customer’s dependence on bank loans, 
DBANKJi: dummies for the type of main bank, 
DINDJi: industry dummies, and 
εi: i.i.d. error term.
9 
 
The dependent variable, LPURCi, is the fraction of intermediate goods purchased 
by firm i from large suppliers. A customer’s dependence on bank loans is measured by 
two variables: the ratio of borrowing from financial institutions to total debt, expressed 
by BLOANi, and the ratio of short-term borrowing from financial institutions to current 
liabilities, SBLOANi. The former captures the total relationship between the customer 
and financial institution, while the latter lays stress on the short-term relationship. 
Incidentally, the correlation coefficient between BLOANi  and  SBLOANi is 0.5732. 
According to the redistributional view of trade credit, less dependence on bank loans 
                                                 
9 The  subscript  i represents the i-th firm.   10 
 
makes customers more dependent on large suppliers to obtain credit by way of accounts 
payable. Thus we expect α4 to be negative.   
A firm’s attributes are controlled by the following variables. First firm size is 
measured by the logarithm of sales, or log SALESi. A firm’s profitability is measured by 
the ratio of operating profit to sales, or PROFITi. We include the debt-asset ratio or 
DEBTRi to measure the debt burden of the firm. The DBANKJ variable is a dummy for 
the type of a customer’s main bank. Main bank dummies consist of six dummies, each 
of which corresponds to one type of bank in rows (1) to (7) in Table 4, that is to say, 
DBANK2 takes unity if the main bank is a regional bank, DBANK3 takes unity if the 
main bank is a Shinkin bank and credit cooperative, and so on. Since we choose as the 
base the case where the main bank is a city bank, DBANK1 is omitted and the number 
of main bank dummies is 6 in all, from DBANK2 to DBANK7. We also include 29 
industry dummies, DINDJi.
10 
The second step is to investigate the relationship between a customer’s dependence 
on large supplies and the amount of its accounts payable. We estimate the following 
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where   
ACPAYi: ratio of balance of accounts payable to sales, 
ASSETi: ratio of total assets to sales, 
COLLAJi: terms of a loan contract with main bank,   
BATTIJi: lending attitude of the main bank, and 
                                                 
10  For a detailed industry classification see Table 1. In the estimation, the second industry, food 
products, is taken as the base industry. Accordingly, we incorporate 29 constant dummy 
variables corresponding to the industry number (1) to (30) in the table, DIND1 to DIND30 
except for DIND2. 11 
 
ξi: i.i.d. error term. 
 
When the redistributional hypothesis of trade credit is valid, the customer more 
dependent on large suppliers will receive larger amounts of accounts payable. In other 
words, we expect δ4 to be positive. The effects of a firm’s wealth and profitability on 
accounts payable are measured by the ratio of total assets to sales, ASSETi, and profits to 
sales, PROFITi, respectively. The variable BDEPENDi measures the direct effect of 
bank dependence on accounts payable, taking a customer’s dependence on large 
suppliers as constant. Even if the dependence on large suppliers remains unchanged, 
increasing availability of bank loans will reduce demand for accounts payable as long as 
bank loans are a cheaper source of funds than trade credit.   
We measure the effect of the main bank relationship on accounts payable by three 
different variables. One is the dummy variable for the type of main bank, DBANKJi, 
which was also used in the first step. Another is the terms of the loan contract with the 
main bank, or COLLAJi. The variables COLLAJi are the dummy variables, each of 
which correspond to the loan contract shown in rows (1) to (5) in Table 5, that is to say, 
COLLA1i takes unity if the firm pledges physical collateral to its main bank, COLLA2i 
takes unity if the firm owner guarantees to repay the principal in case of default, and so 
on. The base is the case of neither collateral nor personal guarantee, so that the number 
of dummies is 4 in total, COLLA1 to COLLA4. 
The other relational variable with a main bank is the lending attitude of the main 
bank, or BATTIJi. The BATTIJi variable consists of the following four dummy variables, 
corresponding to the lending attitude of rows (1) to (5) in Table 6: BATTI1i taking unity 
if a loan application to its main bank was turned down or reduced, BATTI3i taking unity 
if the lending attitude of a main bank increases in severity, BATTI4i taking unity if the 
lending attitude of a main bank gets easier and BATTI5i taking unity if the firm is asked 
to borrow more than it applied for. Since the base is where the loan application is 
accepted as is, we incorporate 4 dummies, BATTI1i to BATTI5i, except for BATTI2i. The 
29 industry dummies are also included as explanatory variables.   12 
 
Taking the first and second steps together, we can say that the redistributional 
hypothesis of trade credit is valid only for the case where α4<0 in equation (1) and δ4>0 
in equation (2) are supported simultaneously.   
4.2 Micro Data Evidence on the Redistributional Hypothesis of Trade Credit 
The estimation results of equation (1) are shown in the first and second columns of 
Table 9. Since LPURCi is below unity and must be at least zero, we use a two-limit 
Tobit regression. When BLOANi is used as a measure of a customer’s dependence on 
financial institutions, the coefficient estimate of BLOANi is significantly negative, 
which implies that the customer more dependent on bank loans will purchase less from 
large suppliers. This is consistent with the redistributional hypothesis of trade credit. On 
the other hand, when SBLOANi is used instead of BLOANi, its coefficient is negative but 
not significant. We also find that the customer with a higher debt-asset ratio tends to 
purchase more from large suppliers, irrespective of the customer-bank relationship 
variable. It might reflect increasing difficulties for the customer burdened with heavy 
debt to borrow from banks.   
We turn to the estimation results of equation (2), which are shown in the first and 
second column of Table 10. Since accounts payable are zero for some firms, we 
estimate equation (2) by a Tobit-estimator.    We find that the customer with large assets 
relative to sales who is less dependent on banks has more accounts payable. 
Furthermore, the coefficient estimate of LPURCi exerts a significantly positive effect on 
accounts payable, irrespective of the customer-bank relationship variable. In other 
words, when a purchase is made from large suppliers, more credit is provided in the 
form of trade credit. This is also consistent with the redistributional hypothesis. To 
combine the evidence obtained from the two steps above, we confirm the 
redistributional role of trade credit for Japanese SMEs. When a firm does not have close 
ties with financial institutions, it tends to purchase from large suppliers to secure credit, 
which in turn leads to an increase  in  accounts  payable.     
To see the quantitative importance of the redistributional role of trade credit, we 
compute the difference in the ratio of accounts payable to sales across industries coming 13 
 
from the difference in LPURCi. As was shown in the previous section, the LPURCi 
variable exhibits wide variations across industries. The variable takes its maximum 
(0.644) for information and communications and its minimum (0.044) for hotels and 
restaurants. Thus the difference in the ratio of purchases from large suppliers makes a 
1.4 percentage point to 1.7 percentage point difference in the ratio of accounts payable 
to sales at the maximum.   
4.3 Does the Redistributional Hypothesis Hold for All Firms?   
To see whether the redistributional role of trade credit is prevalent across firms, we 
reestimate equations (1) and (2) by classifying firms into two different groups. One 
group consists of firms whose debt exceeds total assets, or debt-overhang firms, and the 
other group consists of solvent firms whose debt is smaller than total assets. Before 
examining the estimation results, we compare firm characteristics between solvent and 
debt-overhang firms. The second and third columns of Tables 2 to 6 show firm size in 
terms of number of employees and equity capital, type of main bank, terms of loan 
contract and lending attitude of the main bank, for both solvent firms and debt-overhang 
firms. Debt-overhang firms are in general smaller in terms of number of employees and 
equity capital. The main banks of debt-overhang firms are also smaller in size since 
17% (29%) of main banks for debt-overhang (solvent) firms are city banks, long-term 
credit banks and trust banks, while 33% (20%) are shinkin banks and credit 
cooperatives.  
Table 11 compares the descriptive statistics of major variables between solvent and 
debt-overhang firms. Debt-overhang firms earn much less operating profit than solvent 
firms. Debt-overhang firms are less dependent on bank loans in terms of total and 
short-term borrowing and less dependent on large suppliers. As for the ratio of accounts 
payable to sales, there is no difference between solvent and debt-overhang firms, 
although the ratio of accounts receivable to sales is lower for  debt-overhang  firms.    
The estimation results of equations (1) and (2) for solvent firms are shown in the 
third and fourth columns of Tables 9 and 10, respectively. In the first stage the BLOANi 
variable exerts a significantly negative effect on LPURCi, which in turn affects accounts 14 
 
payable in a significantly positive manner in the second-stage regression. When the  
SBLOANi variable is used, its coefficient is negative and barely significant at the 10% 
level in the first-stage regression. It implies that the redistributional role of trade credit 
is valid for solvent Japanese SMEs.         
On the other hand, the estimation results of equations (1) and (2) for debt-overhang 
firms are shown in the fifth and sixth columns of Tables 9 and 10, respectively. In the 
first stage, the coefficient estimates of BLOANi and SBLOANi are insignificantly 
positive. Furthermore, the debt-asset ratio is also positive and insignificant. In the 
second stage, the coefficient estimate of LPURCi is positive but insignificant. Thus even 
if the debt-overhang firm increases its purchases from large suppliers, accounts payable 
are not necessarily extended to the insolvent firms.   
To sum things up, the redistributional hypothesis of trade credit is only applicable 
for solvent SMEs, not for debt-overhang SMEs. The effect of PROFITi on accounts 
payable also deserves some attention. For solvent firms the coefficient estimate of 
PROFITi is significantly negative, while it is significantly positive for debt-overhang 
firms, irrespective of the customer-bank relationship variable. A negative coefficient of 
profits means that internal funds and accounts payable are substitutes.
11 However, a 
positive coefficient might indicate that the level of profit plays a signaling role in the 
health of debt-overhang customers. Suppliers of trade credit might consider higher 
profitability to guarantee repayment of accounts payable by the debt-overhang firms, 
which would thereby induce suppliers to increase accounts payable to the debt-overhang 
f i r m s .          
4.4 Substitutability between Bank Loans and Trade Credit   
Note that the coefficient estimate of BATTI1i, which indicates that the loan 
application is rejected or reduced by the main bank, is significantly positive for 
debt-overhang firms in Table 10, while it is not significant for solvent firms. When a 
loan application submitted to a main bank by debt-overhang firm is rejected or reduced, 
                                                 
11  Fukuda et al. (2006) also observes that internal funds and trade credit are substitutes 
for one another.   15 
 
it is accompanied by an increase in accounts payable. It suggests that accounts payable 
are a substitute for bank loans for debt-overhang firms. This appears a bit contradictory 
to the evidence above that the redistributional role of trade credit is not supported for 
debt-overhang firms. We can interpret this puzzling evidence as follows. When a loan 
application is rejected by the main bank, the debt-overhang firm tries to secure credit in 
the form of trade credit. Trade credit is not necessarily supplied by large suppliers, but 
by small and medium-sized suppliers that do not in general have easy access to other 
sources of funds.
12 
This implies that substitutability between bank loans and trade credit for 
debt-overhang firms is independent of the redistributional hypothesis. For further 
investigation, we added the cross term of the lending attitude variables BATTI1i and 
BATTI3i with LPURCi in equation (2). When this cross term is positive, substitutability 
between bank loans and trade credit does depend on the extent to which purchases are 
made from large suppliers. In other words, when a loan application to the main bank is 
turned down, reduced or made more severe, more credit can be raised by way of 
accounts payable by the customer more dependent on large suppliers. Table 12 shows 
the estimation results with cross terms for all firms, solvent firms and debt-overhang 
firms, respectively. The coefficient estimate of BATTI1i remains significantly positive 
for debt-overhang firms, but none of the cross terms are significant. On the other hand, 
the cross term of LPURCi with BATTI3i is significantly positive for solvent firms. This 
suggests that substitutability between bank loans and trade credit for solvent firms 
crucially hinges upon the extent to which purchases are made from large suppliers, but 
not for debt-overhang firms.   
5. Concluding Remarks   
This paper investigates the redistributional role of trade credit from the demand side 
based on unique micro data of Japanese SMEs where information on transactions 
between firms of different size is available. The redistributional hypothesis is tested in 
                                                 
12  In this case insolvency might be propagated to other SME suppliers that extend credit 
to debt-overhang firms, since their balance sheets also deteriorate. 16 
 
two steps. In the first step we examine the relationship of bank dependence, measured 
by the ratio of borrowing from financial institutions to total debt, and the ratio of 
short-term borrowing from financial institutions to current liabilities, with dependence 
on large suppliers. In the second step we examine the effect of a dependence on large 
suppliers on the amount of accounts payable. We find evidence supporting the 
redistributional hypothesis for solvent firms. In other words, less dependence on bank 
loans will make customers more dependent on large suppliers, which in turn leads to an 
increase in accounts payable.   
However, the redistributional hypothesis is not supported for firms with a debt 
overhang. It is true that substitutability is observed between bank loans and trade credit 
even for debt-overhang firms, but substitutability is independent of the extent to which  
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Table 1. Sample distribution by industry 
   (1)  (2) 
    
Number of 
firms  Percentage 
(1)  Construction  66 (4.0)  
  Manufacturing: (2) to (23)  306 (18.4)  
(2)      Food products  58 (3.5)  
(3)      Beverage, tabacco, and fodder  11 (0.7)  
(4)      Textiles  8 (0.5)  
(5)      Wearing apparel  14 (0.8)  
(6)      Wood products except furniture  16 (1.0)  
(7)      Furnitures  3 (0.2)  
(8)      Paper and paper products  7 (0.4)  
(9)      Printing and publishing  9 (0.5)  
(10)      Chemicals and chemical products  15 (0.9)  
(11)      Coal and oil products  1 (0.1)  
(12)      Plastic products  25 (1.5)  
(13)      Rubber products  4 (0.2)  
(14)      Leather and leather products  3 (0.2)  
(15)      Stone, clay, and glasses  19 (1.1)  
(16)      Iron and steel  12 (0.7)  
(17)      Non-ferrous metal products  4 (0.2)  
(18)      Metal products  24 (1.4)  
(19)      General machinery  33 (2.0)  
(20)      Electrical machinery  25 (1.5)  
(21)      Transportation equipment  6 (0.4)  
(22)      Precision instrument  5 (0.3)  
(23)      Miscellaneous manufacturing  4 (0.2)  
(24)  Information and communication  49 (3.0)  
(25)  Transportation  59 (3.6)  
(26)  Wholesale  593 (35.7)  
(27)  Real estate  34 (2.0)  
(28)  Hotels and restaurants  29 (1.7)  
(29)  Service  117 (7.1)  
(30)  Retail  406 (24.5)  
 Total  1,659 (100.0)  




Table 2. Sample distribution by number of employees 









(1) 5  or  less  393 262  131
   (23.7)  (18.6)    (52.6) 
(2)  6 to 20  334 276  58
   (20.1)  (19.6)    (23.3) 
(3) 21  to  50  410 375  35
   (24.7)  (26.6)    (14.1) 
(4) more  than  50  522 497  25
   (31.5)  (35.2)    (10.0) 
 Total  1,659 1,410  249
The figures in parentheses are the percentage of the number of corresponding firms in the sub samples. 
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
 
 
Table 3. Sample distribution by equity capital 









(1)  10 million yen or less  815 633 182
   (49.1)  (44.9)    (73.1) 
(2)  more than 10 million yen to 30 million yen  402 363 39
   (24.2)  (25.7)    (15.7) 
(3)  more than 30 million yen to 50 million yen  221 205 16
   (13.3)  (14.5)    (6.4) 
(4)  more than 50 million yen to 100 million yen  160 153 7
   (9.6)  (10.9)    (2.8) 
(5)  more than 100 million yen to 300 million yen  45 41 4
   (2.7)  (2.9)    (1.6) 
(6)  more than 300 million yen  16 15 1
   (1.0)  (1.1)    (0.4) 
 Total  1,659 1,410  249
See the notes in Table 2.  
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises  2 1
 
Table 4. Sample distribution by type of main bank 









(1)  City banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks  447 404 43
   (26.9)  (28.7)    (17.3) 
(2)  Regional and second-tier regional banks  791 678 113
   (47.7)  (48.1)    (45.4) 
(3)  Shinkin banks and credit cooperatives  362 281 81
   (21.8)  (19.9)    (32.5) 
(4)  Government financial institutions for SME  42 33 9
   (2.5)  (2.3)    (3.6) 
(5)  Other government financial institutions  43  1
   (0.2)  (0.2)    (0.4) 
(6)  Financial institutions for agriculture  88  0
   (0.5)  (0.6)    (0.0) 
(7)  No main bank  5 3  2
   (0.3)  (0.2)    (0.8) 
 Total  1,659 1,410  249
See the notes in Table 2.  
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
 
Table 5. Terms of loan contract 









(1)  Physical collateral  1,049 906 143
   (63.2)  (64.3)    (57.4) 
(2)  Personal guarantee  1143 979 164
   (68.9)  (69.4)    (65.9) 
(3)  Third party guarantee  256 208 48
   (15.4)  (14.8)    (19.3) 
(4)  Public guarantee  746 613 133
   (45.0)  (43.5)    (53.4) 
(5)  Neither collateral nor guarantee  103 93 10
   (6.2)  (6.6)    (4.0) 
 Total  1,659 1,410  249
Since the respondents can make more than two choices, the percentages of five choices do not sum up to 100. 
See the notes in Table 2.  
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises  2 2
 
Table 6. Lending attitude of the main bank 









(1)  Loan application was rejected or reduced  118 63 55
   (7.1)  (4.5)    (22.1) 
(2)  Loan application was accepted as it was  739 648 91
   (44.5)  (46.0)    (36.5) 
(3)  The lending condition became severe  354 271 83
   (21.3)  (19.2)    (33.3) 
(4)  The lending condition was loosened  138 130 8
   (8.3)  (9.2)    (3.2) 
(5)  Additional loan was offered by the main bank  310 298 12
   (18.7) (21.1)    (4.8) 
 Total  1,659 1,410 249
See the notes in Table 2.  
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of major variables in the sample 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
   Mean  Median 
Standard 
deviation 
(1)  Account receivable  304  52   746 
(2)  Account payable  271  45   765 
(3)  Total assets  1,385  369   4,421 
(4)  Total debt  1,081  278   4,042 
(5) Total  sales,  SALES 1,860  584    4,088 
(6)  Number of employees (person)  58  31   84 
(7) Operating  profit  40  6    183 
(8)  Borrowing from financial institutions  583  132   2,739 
(9)  Ratio of purchase from small supplier  0.678  0.950   0.390 
(10)  Ratio of purchase from large supplier, LPURC 0.322  0.050    0.390 
(11)  Account receivable / total sales  0.150 0.122    0.148 
(12)  Account payable / total sales, ACPAY 0.118  0.087    0.115 
(13)  Total asset / total sales, ASSET 0.904  0.640    1.146 
(14)  Operating profit / total sales, PROFIT 0.012  0.013    0.105 
(15)  Borrowing from financial institutions / total debt, BLOAN 0.520  0.545    0.258 
(16) Short-term borrowing from financial institutions / current 
liabilities, SBLOAN 
0.300 0.250    0.278 
(17)  Total debt / total asset, DEBTR 0.858  0.830    0.450 
Unit of the variables except for ratios and the number of employees is millions of yen. The capital letters after 
the variable definitions are the abbreviated variable names used in the regression analysis. 
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises   23
Table 8. Means and medians of major variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14) 
    LPURC ACPAY PROFIT ASSET BLOAN  SBLOAN  DEBTR 
   Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
(1)  Construction  0.242 0.000 0.126 0.103 0.017 0.014    0.809 0.692 0.454 0.460 0.303 0.289 0.731 0.765   
  Manufacturing:  (2)  o  (23)  0.215 0.000 0.137 0.116 0.021 0.019    1.001 0.897 0.568 0.603 0.369 0.338 0.754 0.776   
(2)          Food  products  0.176 0.000 0.086 0.066 0.013 0.012    0.898 0.830 0.650 0.738 0.455 0.442 0.797 0.813   
(3)      Beverage, tabacco, and fodder  0.140 0.000 0.061 0.064 0.050 0.011    1.072 0.814 0.450 0.468 0.360 0.492 0.566 0.530   
(4)          Textiles  0.361 0.250 0.135 0.120  -0.008 0.002    1.036 1.064 0.720 0.722 0.507 0.585 0.851 0.887   
(5)          Wearing  apparel  0.359 0.100 0.091 0.089 0.004 0.001    1.063 0.918 0.700 0.764 0.560 0.657 0.727 0.732   
(6)      Wood products except furniture  0.181  0.000 0.131  0.099  -0.007  0.015   1.101  1.011  0.689  0.737  0.537  0.628  0.883  0.882  
(7)          Furnitures  0.067 0.000 0.066 0.062 0.005 0.028    0.616 0.435 0.477 0.524 0.350 0.258 0.632 0.722   
(8)      Paper and paper products  0.279  0.000 0.178  0.179  -0.074  0.005   0.809  0.881  0.367  0.396  0.230  0.222  1.078  1.142  
(9)      Printing and publishing  0.053  0.000 0.135  0.125  0.021  -0.007   0.677  0.623  0.502  0.552  0.127  0.090  0.790  0.795  
(10)      Chemicals and chemical products  0.363  0.250 0.174  0.187  0.055  0.043   1.080  1.269  0.523  0.464  0.342  0.269  0.693  0.705  
(11)      Coal and oil products  0.150  0.150 0.266  0.266  -0.033  -0.033   0.816  0.816  0.094  0.094  0.094  0.094  0.640  0.640  
(12)          Plastic  products  0.108 0.000 0.158 0.161  -0.003 0.016    0.897 0.823 0.459 0.507 0.236 0.137 0.759 0.797   
(13)          Rubber  products  0.353 0.222 0.116 0.131 0.030 0.036    1.118 1.123 0.457 0.445 0.360 0.401 0.421 0.486   
(14)          Leather  and  leather  products  0.195 0.000 0.139 0.106 0.024 0.013    0.936 0.867 0.478 0.523 0.327 0.250 0.708 0.683   
(15)      Stone, clay, and glasses  0.077  0.000 0.180  0.127  0.021  0.020   1.412  1.205  0.581  0.679  0.437  0.496  0.813  0.835  
(16)      Iron and steel  0.349  0.150 0.198  0.178  0.028  0.019   0.851  0.870  0.520  0.574  0.399  0.411  0.761  0.757  
(17)          Non-ferrous  metal  products  0.525 0.550 0.109 0.069 0.083 0.054    0.668 0.666 0.632 0.716 0.242 0.075 0.825 0.870   
(18)          Metal  products  0.192 0.000 0.132 0.136 0.042 0.043    1.135 1.001 0.537 0.606 0.288 0.286 0.641 0.619   
(19)          General  machinery  0.176 0.060 0.172 0.177 0.022 0.024    1.075 1.067 0.593 0.645 0.320 0.262 0.719 0.740   
(20)          Electrical  machinery  0.257 0.280 0.156 0.153 0.042 0.025    0.893 0.826 0.522 0.501 0.294 0.270 0.808 0.844   
(21)          Transportation  equipment  0.366 0.307 0.130 0.148 0.062 0.047    0.959 0.935 0.510 0.513 0.419 0.377 0.638 0.673   
(22)          Precision  instrument  0.520 0.400 0.247 0.208 0.061 0.042    1.241 1.360 0.483 0.299 0.287 0.266 0.627 0.570   
(23)      Miscellaneous manufacturing  0.225  0.000 0.092  0.078  0.033  0.039   1.157  1.072  0.648  0.736  0.462  0.527  0.673  0.695  
(24)  Information  and  communication  0.644 0.750 0.054 0.039 0.013 0.009    0.654 0.577 0.537 0.622 0.302 0.212 0.762 0.773   
(25)  Transportation  0.238 0.000 0.081 0.049  -0.009 0.015    0.824 0.765 0.562 0.641 0.279 0.204 0.853 0.828   
(26)  Wholesale  0.318 0.100 0.154 0.121 0.011 0.011    0.713 0.556 0.479 0.483 0.279 0.234 0.900 0.845   
(27)  Real  estate  0.339 0.000 0.042 0.030 0.123 0.096    4.194 3.621 0.575 0.611 0.317 0.254 0.852 0.872   
(28)  Restaurant  and  hotels  0.044 0.000 0.034 0.023  -0.017 0.031    1.427 1.359 0.597 0.719 0.290 0.204 0.885 0.890   
(29)  Service  0.275 0.000 0.075 0.051 0.011 0.017    1.093 0.700 0.519 0.520 0.260 0.239 0.833 0.819   
(30)  Retail  0.425 0.300 0.090 0.067 0.003 0.008    0.798 0.528 0.537 0.580 0.292 0.240 0.915 0.863   
  Total  0.322 0.050 0.118 0.087 0.012 0.013    0.904 0.640 0.520 0.545 0.300 0.250 0.858 0.830   
For the abbreviation of the variables, see the notes in Table 7.  
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises  2 4
 
Table 9. Determinant of ratio of purchase from large firms 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   
  Whole sample firms  Solvent firms Debt-overhang  firms 
DBANK2 0.0371      0.0353    0.0268    0.0269    0.1248    0.1278   
  (0.77)   (0.73)  (0.54)  (0.54)  (0.71)   (0.73)  
DBANK3 0.0392      0.0369    0.0257    0.0266    0.1215    0.1191   
  (0.63)   (0.59)  (0.39)  (0.40)  (0.63)   (0.61)  
DBANK4 -0.0572      -0.0695    -0.0015    -0.0026    -0.3937    -0.3864   
  (0.43)   (0.52)  (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.74)   (0.73)  
DBANK5 -0.3666      -0.3838    -0.2586    -0.2730           
  (0.87)   (0.91)   (0.58)   (0.61)          
DBANK6 -0.5536      -0.5502    -0.5530    -0.5315           
  (1.34)   (1.31)   (1.38)   (1.30)          
DBANK7 0.2591      0.2819    -0.1554    -0.1044    1.0862    1.0662   
  (0.76)   (0.83)  (0.36)  (0.24)  (1.53)   (1.50)  
Log SALES 0.1670    **  0.1711  ** 0.1618  ** 0.1708  ** 0.1298  *  0.1291  *
  (11.6)   (11.8)   (10.5)   (11.0)   (2.40)   (2.39)  
PROFIT  -0.2006    -0.2188    -0.3325    -0.3430    0.3115    0.3064   
  (0.97)   (1.05)  (1.44)  (1.48)  (0.62)   (0.61)  
DEBTR  0.1076  *  0.1115  * 0.2943  * 0.2117    0.0756    0.0747   
  (2.32)   (2.39)  (2.48)  (1.81)  (0.95)   (0.95)  
BLOAN  -0.2411  **      -0.3411  **     0.0499       
  (3.05)       (3.91)      (0.21)      
SBLOAN      -0.1047        -0.1514        0.0763   
     (1.41)      (1.88)      (0.35)  
CONST.  -2.1905  **  -2.3481  ** -2.2438  ** -2.4348  ** -1.6501  *  -1.6344  *
  (9.39)   (10.3)  (9.13)  (10.0)  (2.09)   (2.12)  
σ  0.7123    0.7145    0.6878    0.6915    0.8159    0.8152   
Number of observations  1,659    1,658    1,410    1,409    234    234  
The figures in parentheses are the asymptotic t-values in absolute value and the symbols * and ** indicate 
that the corresponding coefficients are significant at the 5% and 1%. σ is the estimated standard error of the 
regression. In the subsample for debt-overhang firms, since there is no sample firm for some of the industries 
or the type of main bank, the corresponding industry dummy variables and main bank dummy variables are 
eliminated in the estimation. In addition, for some industries all the sample firms have truncated dependent 
variable, that is to say LPURC is zero. In such a case the corresponding sample firms do not contribute 
stochastically to the estimation and the coefficient of industry dummy variable has no standard error. This is 
also true for main bank dummy, DBANK6.  As a result, 15 sample firms are eliminated from the sample in the 
subsample of debt-overhang firms.  Also, for the estimation with SBLOAN, a sample firm for which current 
liabilities data is missing is eliminated.  2 5
Table 10. Determinant of account payable ratio 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   
  Whole sample firms  Solvent firms Debt-overhang  firms 
DBANK2  -0.0040   -0.0040  -0.0002  0.0007 -0.0320   -0.0346   
  (0.65) (0.64) (0.03) (0.10) (1.65) (1.80)  
DBANK3 -0.0272    ** -0.0297  ** -0.0243  ** -0.0277  ** -0.0380   -0.0379   
  (3.64) (3.94) (3.05) (3.40) (1.83) (1.84)  
DBANK4  0.0007   -0.0076  0.0013  -0.0034  -0.0401   -0.0489   
  (0.04) (0.45) (0.07) (0.19) (0.88) (1.07)  
DBANK5 -0.0524    -0.0564  -0.0919  -0.0948 -0.0139    -0.0106   
  (1.00) (1.07) (1.55) (1.58) (0.13) (0.10)  
DBANK6 0.0104    0.0046  0.0130  0.0074       
  (0.27) (0.12) (0.35) (0.20)      
DBANK7 -0.0723    -0.0642  -0.1228  -0.0990 -0.0724    -0.0597   
 (1.50)  (1.32) (1.86) (1.49) (0.93)  (0.76)  
COLLA1  0.0249  ** 0.0188  ** 0.0332  ** 0.0247  ** -0.0279   -0.0249   
  (4.48) (3.39) (5.63) (4.16) (1.86) (1.66)  
COLLA2  0.0072    -0.0007 0.0066  -0.0029 0.0240    0.0233   
  (1.26) (0.13) (1.09) (0.48) (1.54) (1.50)  
COLLA3  0.0070   0.0059  0.0122  0.0102  -0.0150   -0.0148   
  (1.00) (0.83) (1.62) (1.33) (0.82) (0.81)  
COLLA4  0.0099   0.0013  0.0144  * 0.0033 -0.0074    -0.0107   
  (1.87) (0.24) (2.56) (0.58) (0.52) (0.76)  
BATTI1  0.0046   0.0023  -0.0057  -0.0046  0.0511  ** 0.0451  *
  (0.44) (0.22) (0.43) (0.33) (2.61) (2.35)  
BATTI3  0.0125    0.0084 0.0136 0.0100 0.0255    0.0207   
  (1.85) (1.24) (1.86) (1.34) (1.50) (1.24)  
BATTI4  -0.0089    -0.0118 -0.0090 -0.0107 -0.0306    -0.0351   
  (0.94) (1.24) (0.95) (1.11) (0.76) (0.89)  
BATTI5 -0.0129    -0.0137  * -0.0137  * -0.0144  * 0.0118   0.0177   
  (1.85) (1.96) (1.97) (2.02) (0.35) (0.53)  
PROFIT  -0.0039   -0.0071  -0.0586  * -0.0582  * 0.1263  *  0.1263  *
  (0.16) (0.28) (2.09) (2.03) (2.38) (2.41)  
ASSET  0.0297  ** 0.0292  ** 0.0325  ** 0.0322  ** 0.0267  ** 0.0258  **
  (11.8) (11.5) (11.5) (11.1) (4.97) (4.83)  
BLOAN  -0.1255  **   -0.1501  **  -0.0535    *     
  (11.8)     (13.1)   (1.98)     
SBLOAN   -0.0953  **     -0.1071  **     -0.0641  **
    (10.1)      (10.4)      (2.66)  
LPURC  0.0345  ** 0.0411  ** 0.0337  ** 0.0428  ** 0.0255   0.0267   
  (5.14) (6.07) (4.75) (5.93) (1.39) (1.46)  
CONST.  0.1117  ** 0.0895  ** 0.1036  ** 0.0763  ** 0.2069  ** 0.1939  **
 (6.95)  (5.64) (6.21) (4.58) (4.34)  (4.25)  
σ  0.1001    0.1012 0.0968 0.0988 0.1018    0.1011   
Number of observations  1,659   1,658 1,410 1,409  249   249  
See the notes in Table 9 for the definition of the symbols.  
 





Table 11. Descriptive statistics of major variables in the sub-sample 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Solvent  firms  Debt-overhang  firms 
    Mean Median Mean Median 
(1)  Account receivable  349  69  53   12 
(2)  Account payable  309  59  55   10 
(3)  Total assets  1,571  524  329   74 
(4)  Total debt  1,203  347  391   99 
(5) Total  sales,  SALES 2,114  744  419    133 
(6)  Number of employees(person)  64  36  22   8 
(7) Operating  profit  47  9  -1    0 
(8)  Borrowing from financial institutions  645  169  228   43 
(9)  Ratio of purchase from small supplier  0.671  0.900  0.721   1.000 
(10)  Ratio of purchase from large supplier, LPURC 0.329  0.100  0.279    0.000 
(11)  Account receivable / total sales  0.155 0.126 0.119    0.089 
(12)  Account payable / total sales, ACPAY 0.119  0.088  0.114    0.082 
(13)  Total asset / total sales, ASSET 0.907  0.662  0.887    0.499 
(14)  Operating profit / total sales, PROFIT 0.018  0.014  -0.021    0.000 
(15)  Borrowing from financial institutions / total 
debt, BLOAN 
0.525 0.556 0.495    0.492 
(16) Short-term  borrowing  from  financial 
institutions / Current liabilities, SLOAN
0.306 0.263 0.266    0.148 
(17)  Total debt / total asset, DEBTR 0.746  0.792  1.496    1.221 
See the notes in Table 7.  
Data source: Basic Survey of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises    2 7
Table 12 Determinant of account payable ratio 
  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   
  Whole sample firms  Solvent firms Debt-overhang  firms 
DBANK2  -0.0040   -0.0040  0.0003  0.0010  -0.0323   -0.0344   
  (0.64) (0.64) (0.04) (0.16) (1.66) (1.77)  
DBANK3 -0.0271    ** -0.0297  ** -0.0239  ** -0.0274  ** -0.0369   -0.0358   
  (3.64) (3.94) (2.99) (3.36) (1.77) (1.74)  
DBANK4  0.0013   -0.0072  0.0023  -0.0025  -0.0401   -0.0500   
  (0.08) (0.43) (0.13) (0.14) (0.88) (1.10)  
DBANK5  -0.0533   -0.0571  -0.0921  -0.0951  -0.0110   -0.0045   
  (1.02) (1.09) (1.56) (1.59) (0.10) (0.04)  
DBANK6 0.0110    0.0054  0.0137  0.0083     
  (0.29) (0.14) (0.37) (0.22)      
DBANK7 -0.0712    -0.0634  -0.1242  -0.1002 -0.0784    -0.0685   
 (1.48)  (1.30) (1.88) (1.51) (0.99)  (0.87)  
COLLA1  0.0256  ** 0.0195  ** 0.0338  ** 0.0252  ** -0.0287   -0.0258   
  (4.61) (3.51) (5.73) (4.26) (1.92) (1.73)  
COLLA2  0.0069    -0.0009 0.0057  -0.0038 0.0245    0.0234   
  (1.21) (0.16) (0.93) (0.61) (1.57) (1.51)  
COLLA3  0.0069   0.0058  0.0122  0.0100  -0.0132   -0.0128   
  (0.99) (0.82) (1.62) (1.30) (0.72) (0.70)  
COLLA4  0.0100   0.0013  0.0144  * 0.0033 -0.0072    -0.0108   
  (1.88) (0.25) (2.57) (0.58) (0.51) (0.77)  
BATTI1  0.0057   0.0078  -0.0190  -0.0114  0.0671  ** 0.0646  **
  (0.44) (0.59) (1.07) (0.62) (2.86) (2.80)  
BATTI3  0.0014    -0.0013 0.0002  -0.0027 0.0251    0.0232   
  (0.17) (0.15) (0.02) (0.29) (1.23) (1.15)  
BATTI4  -0.0088    -0.0118 -0.0089 -0.0106 -0.0303    -0.0343   
  (0.93) (1.24) (0.94) (1.10) (0.76) (0.87)  
BATTI5 -0.0124    -0.0134    -0.0132    -0.0139  * 0.0097   0.0142   
  (1.79) (1.91) (1.90) (1.97) (0.29) (0.42)  
BATTI1*LPURC -0.0027    -0.0163  0.0387    0.0204    -0.0550    -0.0679   
  (0.11) (0.65) (1.20)   (0.62)   (1.23)    (1.51)  
BATTI3*LPURC 0.0356    *  0.0310 0.0415  * 0.0391  * 0.0044    -0.0075   
  (2.22) (1.92) (2.39)   (2.21)   (0.10)    (0.18)  
PROFIT  -0.0039   -0.0070  -0.0581  * -0.0577  * 0.1276  *  0.1278  *
  (0.16) (0.28) (2.07) (2.02) (2.42) (2.45)  
ASSET  0.0297  ** 0.0291  ** 0.0327  ** 0.0322  ** 0.0266  ** 0.0255  **
  (11.8) (11.4) (11.5) (11.1) (4.95) (4.80)  
BLOAN  -0.1261  **   -0.1511  **  -0.0563    *     
  (11.9)   (13.2) (2.08)   
SBLOAN   -0.0957  **     -0.1074  **     -0.0693  **
   (10.1)     (10.5)       (2.85)  
LPURC  0.0272  ** 0.0358  ** 0.0238  ** 0.0342  ** 0.0384   0.0468   
  (3.45) (4.51) (2.95) (4.17) (1.38) (1.68)  
CONST.  0.1149  ** 0.0919  ** 0.1085  ** 0.0805  ** 0.2046  ** 0.1902  **
 (7.13)  (5.77) (6.47) (4.81) (4.30)  (4.18)  
σ  0.1000    0.1010 0.0966 0.0986 0.1013    0.1005   
Number of observations  1,659   1,658 1,410  1,409 249   249   
See the notes in Table 9 for the definition of the symbols.   
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Figure 1 Frequency distribution of the ratio of purchases from large suppliers 